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This paper analyzes an asymmetric information model where the financing needs of entrepreneurs
are obtained from two sources. We show that adverse selection is only important if the credit
constraint of banks is not too tight. Next, we show that banks can induce a pattern of corporate
ownership, whereby safe firms end up owning shares in risky firms. This particular type of an
incentive compatible debt contract can solve the adverse selection problem caused by credit
rationing under asymmetric information. Our theory gives a theoretical backing for the existence
of business groups containing firms that operate in diversified markets.
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In a world with asymmetric information between banks and firms, simple debt contracts
may suffer from the lemon problem. The reason is that banks have to charge a common
interest rate for all firms if firms cannot be identified. This may result in safe firms
staying out of the market and only risky firms entering the market. In other words, risky
firms drive out the safe firms, and this is inefficient from a social point of view, assuming
that the projects of safe firms are economically viable and socially valuable. So,
asymmetric information may lead to equilibrium rationing of external funds available for
real investment (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981)
The existing literature considers different mechanisms by which adverse
selection problems can be solved. Some authors point to the need of government
intervention by means of subsidies or taxes (see, e.g. Gale, 1990). The problem of this
solution is that government interventions often have a cost. Other authors show that
introducing collateral as an additional instrument for banks can solve the adverse
selection problem. A basic reference is Bester (1985) who shows that a separating
equilibrium with no credit rationing will result if banks compete by choosing collateral
requirements and the lending rate simultaneously. This solution, however, is not useful
for most developing countries or emerging markets since collateral is often not available.
The recent literature on micro credit institutions, such as the Grameen Bank (see
Morduch, 1999a and Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999), offers a possibility to solve
adverse selection problems, which seems to be more relevant for developing countries.
This literature deals with financial linkages in the form of cross-guarantees of loans. It is
argued that debt contracts with joint liability, such that successful firms are forced to pay
a joint liability component if another affiliated firm fails, may improve efficiency. The
key to this result is that debt contracts containing a joint-liability component provide
incentives for assortative matching (Becker, 1993) implying that similar types of firms
group together (Ghatak, 2000). Ghatak and Kali (2000) apply the joint-liability
framework to explain the working of business groups in emerging markets. The
3assortative matching property enables banks to price discriminate between borrowers
since the group of risky firms is less willing to accept an increase in the joint-liability
component than the group of safe firms. However, it seems as if the little empirical
evidence available refutes the basic message of the joint liability literature. For instance,
Sadoulet and Carpenter (1999) find strong evidence that firms of different types form
groups, which implies that assortative matching does not hold. Moreover, several authors
question the effectiveness of joint-liability programmes (see Diagne, 1998, and the
references therein). There are also some theoretical problems (discussed below in Section
5) with the assortative matching solution (Gangopadhyay and Lensink, 2001).
The aim of this paper is to point at another possibility to solve adverse selection
problems, which we think is empirically very relevant and does not have the theoretical
problems of the joint-liability solution. In particular, the paper shows that banks can solve
adverse selection problems caused by asymmetric information by offering an incentive
compatible contract that induces a risky and a safe firm to group together. The debt
contract is such that the risky firm becomes liable for the failure of the safe firm. So, in
contrast to the 
 joint liability contracts in which both firms become liable for the
failure of the other firm, our contract is a 		joint liability contract. We will term this
a one-sided joint liability (OJL) contract. The contract can be characterized as one where
a safe firm owns a part of the risky firm. The analysis is done by using a simple
asymmetric information model, where the financing needs of firms are obtained from two
sources. As far as we know, no study has done this before.
In addition to the literature mentioned above, the literature that tries to explain
conglomerate mergers on financial grounds has some similarities to our paper. However,
in contrast to our paper, that literature does not consider the link between debt contracts
and the type of firms, distinguished by their probability of success, that group together.
The similarity with our paper stems from the basic idea that mergers can be beneficial
since they may lower borrowing costs. Lewellen (1971) is a well-known example. He
shows that a merger of two firms can be beneficial since a merger may lead to a fall in the
4probability of default. If this leads to an increase in bank borrowing, the merger may be
value increasing. In his model, the advantage of a merger is the result of the fact that
corporate interest expenses are tax deductible, so that replacing equity with debt lowers
the total cost of capital. See also Higgins and Schall (1975) and Galai and Masulis (1976)
for a discussion. A major difference with our paper is that the literature on mergers
implicitly assumes that, in line with the joint-liability literature, after the merger each
enterprise guarantees the other’s debt in case of default. In our paper, such guarantees are
not directly a part of the debt contract. However, by virtue of ownership of shares in the
successful firm, a firm has income even when its revenues are zero from its own project.
It is as if, a firm pledges the income from the ownership of another firm to pay its debt
obligations on the project it itself controls. So, there are no cross-guarantees, but there is a
one-sided joint-liability contract.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 and Section 3 deal with stand-alone
firms in a model with full information and asymmetric information, respectively. We
compare the social surplus for both cases, assuming that there are too little funds
available from the bank. Section 4 derives an incentive compatible debt contract that
induces safe firms to take over risky firms. Section 5 discusses a possible empirical




There is a continuum of risk neutral entrepreneurs in the interval ]1,0[ . There is one risky
project available with each entrepreneur, so that entrepreneurs and projects are
interchangeable. There are two types of projects, and hence, entrepreneurs. The project
types are distinguished by their probability of success  . Let 
W
  be the probability of
success of project type  ,, = , and 
W
  be the output when the project succeeds. Both






Using the second order stochastic dominance as a definition of risk (Rothschild and
Stiglitz, 1970), we term the   entrepreneurs as the safe borrowers and the 
entrepreneurs as the risky borrowers. Also observe that, A.1 implies that 
VU
 > . Each
project requires a unit of investment. Entrepreneurs do not have initial wealth, so they
cannot self-finance their projects. Each entrepreneur decides on investing in the project,
and hence raising funds from outside lenders, or not undertaking the project.
The set-up of the model so far resembles the models by e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981) and Mankiw (1986). However, in contrast to these models we assume that there
are two sources of funds, a debt market and an equity market. The supplier of funds in the
debt market is a bank that offers limited liability debt contracts, but may be unable to
satisfy the demand for the full one unit of investment by all entrepreneurs. If the bank
does not supply the entire unit of investment, the remainder is obtained from the stock
market. Let   be the cost of funds raised from the stock market and ρ  the opportunity
cost of the bank’s resources.
"% 1≥>≥ ρµ 
&% 		
				 
A.2 makes two major points. First, it says that all projects are viable even at the higher
cost of equity. This is not necessary in our model, but makes it simpler to analyze.
Observe that, if ρµ >≥ , then there exists a ratio of debt to equity,  , such that
ρµ  +−= )1( . However, this will restrict our solutions to debt equity ratios that are
higher than  . Since we want to concentrate on the incentive to form groups because of
asymmetric information, we do not want to have an additional source of complication.
6Second, A.2 implies that equity is more expensive than a bank debt. In an
emerging economy or a developing economy context, we can characterize the cheaper
source as a nationalized development bank or a micro-credit institution with subsidized
government or external funds, or any deposit-taking bank with (implicit or explicit)
deposit insurance. The more expensive source could be the stock market, a non-bank
financial institution, the informal credit market, etc. In most of the currently emerging
Asian economies, where banks are often directly or indirectly protected through
government policy, and stock markets are still to be fully developed, such a
characterization, of the equity cost being higher than bank debt, will hold. These features
have also been historically evident in countries like Japan and South Korea. More
generally, even in the most developed financial markets, no project is entirely debt
financed. Also, credit rationing is a widely observed phenomenon in all markets. Our
approach allows us to study these aspects.
There are several possibilities to explain the coexistence of alternative types of
finance (see Freixas and Rochet, 1997, chapter 2). Most available models try to explain
why some firms issue direct debt (equity issue) and some firms use intermediated finance
(bank debt), despite the fact that direct debt is assumed to be cheaper.  The basic idea is
that due to moral hazard problems in a world of asymmetric information not all firms are
able to issue direct debt.  A very well known example is Diamond (1991). He assumes
that firms need to build up a reputation before they can issue direct debt. These models,
however, cannot explain the coexistence of cheap and expensive sources of finance with
full information.
In this paper, we consider another reason for the coexistence of alternative
sources of funds. We simply assume that the bank has insufficient funds. This implies
that with full information also, entrepreneurs need to obtain funds from two sources.
Credit rationing is in this case a result of a lack of funds with banks, and not because of
moral hazard. Our assumption regarding the lack of funds with the bank is a consequence
of the so-called dis-equilibrium credit rationing. In contrast to equilibrium rationing as a
7result of asymmetric information, analyzed by e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and also
considered in section 3 of this paper, dis-equilibrium rationing assumes that the price
mechanism does not work perfectly. Our approach imparts a dose of realism into the
model, especially for the case of emerging economies. The reason is that most emerging
markets have not yet fully liberalized the financial sector and government controlled
banks, or directed credit policies favoring certain types of investment, are still common in
these countries. Being cheaper than the market rate, such credit is naturally characterized
by excess demand and, hence, there is a certain amount of credit rationing on these
projects even in the case of full information.
In particular, we assume the following:
'% 
	! " !	 1
2
1 ≤< " 
Note that the range of solutions also contains the case of unlimited funds of banks
(characterized by 1=" ). Let the proportion of safe and risky projects be the same.3 Let
W
"  be the amount of funds offered by the bank to project type  ,, = . Given equal








The entrepreneur makes a profit of )1(
WWW
" −−−µ , where   is the (limited
liability) debt claim of the bank from firm type  ,, = . Under full information, and
zero profit for banks, 
WWW
" ρ= . Thus, the entrepreneur’s profit can be written as
W
" )( ρµ −+− . The total surplus, # , generated by these projects will be the sum of
8profits by the safe and risky entrepreneurs, since banks exactly cover costs. With the






















Clearly, the surplus is increasing in " , given A.2. This is because efficiency demands
that the lowest priced funds get used up first. Also, the total surplus is independent of the
distribution of bank funds between the safe and risky projects. Consequently, any 
V
"  and
"  that satisfy (1) maximize the total surplus. In particular, """ UV ==  is a solution to
the problem.
Note that under full information, unlimited funds and A.1 to A.3, the bank will
demand a debt claim 
W
  from each project such that ρ=
WW
  for a unit of investment in
each project. Each entrepreneur then gets ρµµ −=−
WW
 . This is the optimal outcome
from a social point of view if the price mechanism would work perfectly. In this case, the
more expensive source of funds, say the equity market, will not exist and consequently all
entrepreneurs invest and only use the cheapest funds available. This is the general






So far we have been assuming that the project types are common knowledge. In this
section, we assume that this is private knowledge with the entrepreneur. Given our
assumptions on equal proportions of safe and risky projects, if all projects take bank
finance, the bank has to assume that the probability of getting repaid is the average
probability of success, 2/)(   += . Since the bank cannot distinguish between
9good and bad projects, it offers the same contract to everybody. If   is the bank claim,
and "  the bank loan, the bank will put " ρ= . The return to an entrepreneur of type







WW )()1( ρµρµ −+−=−−−
This expression allows us to focus on the major problem we want to address. If firms are





Alternatively, if firms are entirely equity financed, then the cost to the firm is   and,
hence, the expected profit to the entrepreneur is −µ . So, the profit of the entrepreneur
improves by an amount )( ρ














 −<<− . Thus, while safe firms
will not take a limited liability contract from the bank, the risky firms will. But the bank
should know this and, hence, cannot assume that the probability of success on a project to
which it has lent is  . The bank is better off putting a debt claim that satisfies
" ρ= , instead. If all risky projects take all their money from the bank, the total
demand for loans will be )2/1( , since the measure of risky firms is )2/1( , and the bank


















Proof: We only need to show that the total surplus is less than the full information case.
In this scenario, where safe projects are funded entirely through the stock market and the








The last term on the right of (3) is the same as the last term in equation (2) and the last
inequality follows from A.4.
<
It follows immediately that this result also holds with unlimited funds of banks
( 1=" ). So, in addition to the dis-equilibrium credit rationing caused by a lack of bank
funds, there is now also a cost in terms of a lower surplus due to equilibrium credit
rationing. Despite the fact that there is an excess demand for credit and there are excess
funds, banks are not willing to increase the loan interest rate due to adverse selection.
This is basically the Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) result. 4  It should be noted that the coexistence
of cheap and expensive funds, in contrast to Section 2, is now primarily explained by
problems of asymmetric information, in line with the analysis of the usual models.
+,	"% #&'(&+&)!	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Proof: If "  is the loan given by the bank, and all risky firms take the loan, the total
demand from them will be ")2/1( . If "" 2= , all the bank funds are exhausted. Observe
that, since 12 ≤" , the risky projects have to obtain funds from the equity market also.







and this is exactly the same as that in (2). 
<
The reason for this outcome is that as long as )2/1(>" , some cheap bank funds
are wasted if there is asymmetric information since safe firms are not borrowing from the
banks. However, if there is full information all bank funds will be used. If )2/1(≤" , all
cheap bank funds are used, both in the situation of perfect information as well as when
there is asymmetric information. Observe that the credit constraint here has two
implications. One is the fact that 1<" . The other is that such a constraint is essential if
both the equity and debt markets are to function with ρ> .
' !-.	+/
!
In the previous section we showed under what conditions the return to entrepreneurs is
affected in the presence of a credit constraint and when project types are private
information to the project owners. In this section we will show that it is possible for a
12
bank to devise contracts that combine projects in such a way that even when A.4 and A.5
hold, the outcome is such that the surplus with the entrepreneurs is the same as that under
full information.
Suppose the bank gives the following set of contracts. To a single entrepreneur
who asks for a loan, it offers a standalone (SA) contract ),(
$$
"  where, 
$
  is the
limited liability debt claim by the bank against a loan of  (ρ
$
" )/U. However, if two
entrepreneurs come together and apply for a combined loan, then it offers the contract
),(
--
"  to the two firms. It is the nature of 
-
  that is important here. In particular, such
a contract specifies that one of the two entrepreneurs will be liable for the failure of the
other project. We will term this a one-sided joint liability (OJL) loan. More specifically,
the one who holds the OJL will not only pay 
-
  when it is successful, it will pay another
-
  when it is successful but the other is not. The loan the two firms together gets for this
equals 2"- . Our OJL contract in fact corresponds to a takeover of one firm (the firm who
becomes liable for the failure of the other firm) by another firm (the owner).
Our purpose here is to argue that the bank can successfully encourage firms to get
together in such a way that a type ,,,  =  will get together with a type  ,, = .
Define the ordered pair ),(   to mean that   takes on the liability of  . We consider
the two entrepreneurs together, and denote the payoffs they jointly make to the bank as
),( - . Since we are considering a pair of entrepreneurs, we have four possible states -

































The first line of (4) is the payment each makes if both are successful. The second line
says that if   fails and   succeeds,   pays off its own debt as well as that of  . 		
	

	 !  	
 2  The third line signifies that   has no liability for   and hence, the bank gets
paid the dues from   only. The fourth line says that if both fail, no payments are made to




Recall that the pair needs 2  units of investment and the bank gives them an amount























For the rest of our paper, we will consider the following types of contracts:
!%  !#&! ),( && " (	$				!.!





















(c) """ & =≤
Let ),(  π  be the (expected) profit of firm  , and ),(  π  be the
profit of the firm  , when they form the pair ),(  . Recall that this implies that 
takes on the liability of  . If a firm  goes alone, we will denote its profit as )(φπ .
Suppose that   and   form a pair. If both are of the same type, it is natural to assume
that they will equally divide the surplus. Then, from (6),














" )()()()( ρµρµφπ −+−=−+−=
Given A.5, and that  < , it follows that a safe firm will never take a standalone
contract. It can do better by accessing only the equity market, where it gets a return
)( −µ . Thus, if a safe firm obtains any debt, it must be paired with some other firm.
For each pair formed by the safe firm, we have,
(9)  - ])2([),( +−=
(10)  - ])2([),( +−=
(11)  - ])2([),( +−=
The only other possible pair is made up of two risky firms.
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(13)  - ])2([),( +−=
From (6), the lower is ),( - , the higher is the profit of the pair. Thus, to determine
what groups get formed, we need to consider the relative values of (.,.)- .
For an OJL contract to be meaningful, the firm that takes on the liability of
another firm, must have a high enough return, when successful, to pay not only its own
debt obligation, but that of the other firm also. This will always be the case if  
MV
 2≥ .














At )2/1(=" , the numerator on the right-hand-side of A.6 is equal to 2 . At   close to
 , the denominator is greater than 2 . Recall that A.4 had )2/1(>" . From A.2, we
know that A.6 will always be satisfied for "  arbitrarily close to, but greater than, )2/1( ,
if the probabilities of success of the two types of firms are not too far apart. Also, observe




Proof:  From equation (8), using A.5, we have already shown that a safe firm will not
accept the SA contract. This is because it could do better by accessing the equity market
alone.





 )()()()()( ρµρµφπ −+−=−+−=
We now show that if it joins hand with another risky entrepreneur, then it can pay its













































































The weak inequality follows from C.1(c). Thus, a risky firm can always do better by
forming a group with another risky firm.
<
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Thus, no firm uses the SA contract. However, we will now show that it is
possible for safe firms to access bank credits by combining with a risky firm. In
particular, we will argue that the ordered pair ),(  , where a risky firm takes on the
liability of a safe firm, is optimal for the entrepreneurs.

























Step 1:  We first show that, given A.6, it is possible for both types of firms to take on the
























, which is A.6.




Thus, for it to form a pair with a safe firm, it must be assured of at least this much. A
risky and a safe firm can form a pair in two ways --- ),(  , risky taking on the liability of

































































which is lays true. Thus, the safe firm will not form the pair ),(  .








































which is true since 10 <<<   . Thus, a safe firm will not form a group with
another safe firm.
Step 4:  We will now show that it pays the safe firm to induce a risky firm to take on its
liability. From Lemma 1, we know that if it goes alone, it will confine itself to raising
equity since that is better than the SA contract. Given Steps 1 and 2, we need to show that














































which is our condition in the Proposition.
Putting together Steps 2, 3 and 4, we know that a safe firm can induce a risky
firm to take on its liability.
Step 5:  The fact that the total surplus with the entrepreneurs is the same as in the
situation where the bank knows the project types follows directly from comparing total
20
group profits with (2). Recall that we have equal numbers of safe and risky firms, or
)2/1(=θ . Thus, if a risky firm takes over the liability of a safe firm, the surplus with the
entrepreneurs is the sum of the profits made by each pair ),(  . The total measure of






 "# +−−+−=Π= µ
Plugging in the expression for  , and remembering that the total funds with the bank
equals " , it follows that,
"# )( ρµ −+−= ,
which equals (2).
It should also be noted that the conditions under which a risky firm takes on the
liability of the safe firm do not depend on " !so that our OJL contract solves the adverse
selection problem both in the cases of limited and unlimited bank funds. With unlimited
funds our OJL contract leads to a surplus with entrepreneurs of ρµ −=# , which equals
the first best.
Step 6:  Finally, we need to prove that banks make zero profits and that the range on   is
feasible. The fact that banks make zero profit is immediate from plugging in the value of
  in equation (5) and observing that this is equal to the total cost of funding the group,


















As a result of the success of the Grameen Bank’s model there is a growing literature on
group lending with joint liability. Several authors, however, start to question whether the
success of the Grameen Bank is primarily related to the joint liability debt contract. Jain
(1996), for instance, argues that the socioeconomic context and the organizational
structure, including strong leadership and emphasis on training, is the prime reason for
the success.  In addition, Morduch (1999a p. 1579) states that the role of group lending
with joint liability has been exaggerated. There is also growing evidence that micro-
finance institutions like the Grameen bank cannot survive without being continuously
subsidized. Morduch (1999b) estimates that the effective subsidies to the Grameen bank
are about US$175 million for the 1985-1996 period. According to him, this is the reason
why private commercial banks have not started to create group-lending programs like the
Grameen bank in order to lend to the poor.
The joint liability clause is an important reason for both the ineffectiveness of
many group lending programs and the need for subsidies. Indeed, there are serious
theoretical problems with the joint-liability approach. Suppose firm A forms a group with
firm B. While they pay   for their own loan, they pay   in case the other fails. Ghatak
(2000) shows that the solution requires that  > . So the pair pays more to the bank
when one of them fails and the other succeeds,  + , compared to the case when both
succeed,  + . This makes it rational for the succeeding firm to pass on an amount   to
the failing firm, who then pays to the creditor its committed payment. Thus, while the
creditor expected to get  +  with some probability, this argument suggests that it may
never get this payment. The zero profit calculation of the creditor, therefore, breaks down
(Gangopadhyay and Lensink, 2001). Consequently, the lender will make a loss and will
need to be subsidized.
The theoretical and empirical problems with joint-liability calls for a rethinking
of its role in micro-finance activities, especially since micro-finance programs are
expected to grow considerably in the near future (Ledgerwoord, 1999). The OJL contract
we have derived in this paper can serve as a basic framework that can be used to develop
22
a new form of a 		 joint liability contract that does not have the theoretical problems
of the 
joint liability solution.5 Our OJL contract can solve the adverse selection
problem by using the advantages of peer pressure related to group lending. At the same
time, the OJL contract, in contrast to the joint liability equilibria worked out in Ghatak
(2000), does not violate the ex post rationality.
Our OJL contract also has some implications for the study of conglomerates and
business groups. The joint liability literature suggests that business groups should contain
firms with similar risk profiles (Ghatak, 2000 and Ghatak and Kali, 2000). Our theory,
however, expects the opposite: firms with opposite risk profiles should form business
groups. It is difficult to make a direct link between the theoretical concept of risk profiles
and actual behavior of firms, but one would expect that our theory would imply that firms
producing different products and operating in different markets would get together. There
is ample empirical evidence that shows that indeed firms in business groups often operate
in diversified markets (see footnote 17 in Ghatak and Kali, forthcoming).6 Our model
simply gives a theoretical explanation for this.
Finally, our theory suggests a particular direction of corporate ownership. In our
model, a risky firm taking over the liability of a safe firm is formally equivalent to a safe
firm owning a risky firm. Observe that, an OJL contract is implemented through the
payment of a failed safe firm’s debt obligations, from the returns of a successful risky
firm. Given the hierarchy of claims, a successful risky firm first pays its own debt






 of the risky firm, then its return is equal to   and, it can meet its debt
obligations even when it fails. On an OJL loan of "2 , the bank faces two default states --
- with probability   )1( −  it gets back only  , and with probability
)1)(1(   −−  it gets back nothing. Alternatively, if it has a loan portfolio made up of
two separate SA contracts, it faces default in three states, with probabilities   )1( − ,
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  )1( −  and )1)(1(   −− . The bank, therefore, makes a higher return from
lending to combined projects. In a competitive environment, therefore, the terms of an
OJL contract are better for the firms. Observe that, at & "" = , &  > . This may
explain why, the emerging market literature cites evidence of group firms finding it easier
to get credit, compared to standalone firms.
0 !!$ .	
1
This paper analyzes a simple asymmetric information model where the financing needs of
entrepreneurs are obtained from two sources. We first compare the surplus with the
entrepreneurs under full, and asymmetric, information if banks are funds constrained. We
show that adverse selection is only important if the credit constraint of banks is not too
tight. The reason is that in the case where the credit constraint of banks is very tight, all
cheap bank funds get used. Hence, there is no inefficiency resulting from excess bank
funds when some projects cannot raise debt.
Next, we use the model to derive a particular type of an incentive compatible
debt contract, that can solve the adverse selection problem caused by credit rationing
under asymmetric information. We show that banks can induce a pattern of corporate
ownership, whereby safe firms end up owning shares in risky firms. This leads to a first
best outcome. We label such a contract a one-sided joint liability contract to make the
comparison with the recent wave of literature on joint liability lending.
In contrast to the debt contracts applied by the joint liability literature, our debt
contract does not imply the assortative matching property, since different types of firms
group together. Our theory, therefore, gives a theoretical backing for the existence of
business groups containing firms that operate in diversified markets.
In addition, our theory does not suffer from a major theoretical shortcoming of
joint liability contracts. Joint liability contracts suffer from being ex post irrational, which
probably is an important reason for the ongoing need to subsidize micro-finance group
lending programs. Our theory does not have this problem, and thus can be used as an
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1
 The assumption of equal expected returns for all projects is in line with Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981), but in contrast to De Meza and Webb (1987). De Meza and Webb (1987) assume that
payoffs in states are all the same for all projects, while the expected returns differ.
2
 We assume that a bank (debt market) exists, and abstract from the possibility that endogenous
intermediary coalitions emerge which evaluate projects ex ante in such a way that firms’
incentives are affected, leading to a Pareto-optimal allocation. For this type of models, see e.g.
Boyd and Prescott (1986) and Williamson (1988). More in general, our model does not consider
possible monitoring activities of banks which may improve the efficiency of the decentralized
outcomes with asymmetric information (see e.g. Diamond, 1984 and Ramakrishnan and Thakor,
1984).
3
 This is a simplifying assumption. In general, one can have η to be the number of safe projects
and (1-η) to be the number of risky projects.
4
 The Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) outcome leads to underinvestment from a social point of view. Note
that some authors, e.g. De Meza and Webb (1987), show that asymmetric information may also
lead to overinvestment. In the latter paper there is no credit rationing. This is basically a
consequence of their assumption that payoffs in different states are the same for all projects. In a
recent paper, De Meza and Webb (2000) show that excessive lending from a social point of view
may also occur in combination with a credit-rationing equilibrium.
5
 The term 		 joint liability contract is borrowed from Diagne (1998). Diagne (1998) points
out that a 
joint liability contract is ineffective since it probably has a negative effect on
voluntairy savings. He shows that some form of a 		 joint liability contract may improve on
this outcome.
6
 It should be noted that Ghatak and Kali (2000) explain the existence of business groups with
firms that operate in diversified markets by pointing out that these firms are probably similar in
terms of quality.
